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The West and Congressional
Fights before the Civil War
Mark O. Hatfield Lecture Series Post-Lecture Discussion
PUBLIC HISTORY ROUNDTABLE

with William L. Lang, Jeffrey Ostler, and Stacey L. Smith
moderated by Kenneth R. Coleman
This roundtable conversation was hosted virtually on Thursday, March 18,
2021, as a follow-up to a lecture two days prior. The transcript has been edited for clarity.

ELIZA CANTY-JONES: Good eve-

ning, and thank you, everyone, for
joining us for tonight’s “reflection
roundtable.” We begin tonight’s program as we often do our events, by
taking a moment to acknowledge
that wherever we are in Oregon, and
indeed anywhere in the Americas, we
are on Indigenous land. I’m speaking
to you tonight from Portland, which
is located on the homelands of the
Multnomah, Kathlamet, Clackamas,
Tumwater, Watlala bands of the Chinook, the Tualatin Kalapuya, and the
many other Indigenous nations of the
Columbia River. We take this time to
honor those people’s ancestral and
ongoing connections to this place
and also to recognize the violence
that attended other people’s coming
and settling here. And we encourage
everyone to spend some time learning about the Indigenous peoples on
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whose land you live, work, or play
here in Oregon.
Just two days ago, Dr. Joanne
Freeman joined us for a virtual presentation on her book, The Field of Blood:
Violence in Congress and the Road to
the Civil War. As increasing numbers of
people become vaccinated, it seems
that, where the virus is concerned, our
worst days are gone. Violence in politics, however, has increased in recent
months. Something we’ve gained
through the pandemic is the opportunity
to create new programs, and tonight’s is
part of a series designed to allow us to
reflect on the Mark O. Hatfield Lecture
Series presentations.
Through these new reflection
roundtables, we have the opportunity
to listen in on conversations among
historians and community leaders that
enable us to bring the Hatfield lectures
home to Oregon. We are grateful to our

© 2021 Oregon Historical Society

PARTICIPANTS in the public history roundtable that followed the March 16, 2021, Mark

O. Hatfield lecture are pictured here: Kenneth R. Coleman (top left), Stacey Smith (top
right), Jeffrey Ostler (bottom left), and William L. Lang (bottom right).

sponsors, whose unwavering support of
OHS [Oregon Historical Society] and the
work of the Hatfield series has allowed
us to persist into the virtual realm,
including by bringing Amanda Tyler and
John Meacham and two more reflection
roundtables to audiences this spring.
I’ll introduce tonight’s panelists
and our facilitator, who has a number
of questions prepared. Please feel
free to add your own. William L. Lang
is author and editor of several books
on Pacific Northwest history and the
history of the northern plains, including Confederacy of Ambition: William
Winlock Miller and the Making of
Washington Territory. Dr. Lang is currently completing a biography of Joel
Palmer, who was Superintendent of
Indian Affairs for the Oregon territory
during the 1850s. Jeffrey Ostler is the
Beekman Professor of Northwest and

Pacific History at the University of Oregon. He specializes in the history of
the American West, with an emphasis
on American Indian history. Dr. Ostler’s
publications include Prairie Populism:
The Fate of Agrarian Radicalism in
Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa; The
Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism
from Lewis and Clark to Wounded
Knee; The Lakotas and The Black
Hills; and, most recently, Surviving
Genocide: Native Nations and the
United States from the American Revolution to Bleeding Kansas. Stacey L.
Smith is Associate Professor of History
at Oregon State University. She is the
author of Freedom’s Frontier: California and the Struggle over Unfree
Labor, Emancipation, and Reconstruction, which won the inaugural David
Montgomery prize in U.S. labor history
from the Labor and Working-Class His-
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tory Association and the Organization
of American Historians.
Our moderator is Kenneth R. Coleman, who teaches U.S. History at
Portland Community College. His first
book, “Dangerous Subjects”: James D.
Saules and the Rise of Black Exclusion,
won the Francis Fuller Victor Award
for General Nonfiction at the 2019
Oregon Book Awards, and his Oregon
Historical Quarterly article, “ ‘We’ll all
Start Even’: White Egalitarianism and
the Oregon Donation Land Act,” won
the Western History Association’s 2020
Michael P. Malone Award. Please join
me in virtually welcoming our panelists
and our facilitator.

KENNETH R. COLEMAN: Thanks to
the Oregon Historical Society for putting this panel together and giving me
this opportunity to really engage in this
history in a way that I normally wouldn’t
have been able to, and thanks, also, to
the sponsors and the patrons. To begin,
I want to ask the panelists about your
impressions, your initial response after
reading this book, if it changed your
understanding of this history at all, if it
changed your understanding of your
own field, or even if it changes the
way that you might teach this period
to students.
STACEY L. SMITH: One of the things
that reading the book reinforced for
me — I’m sure a topic that will come up
as we continue to talk this evening — is
the power of conspiracy in American
politics. If you study this era, you know
that there were a lot of conspiracy theories about different groups attempting
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to take over the government, from the
Freemasons to the Pope to, eventually,
by the 1850s, competing conspiracies:
the “Abolitionist Conspiracy” on one
end and the “Slave Power Conspiracy”
on another.
I think it’s easy — and I’ve probably
been guilty of this myself — to really
dismiss these conspiracy theories as
being overwrought, [to scoff that] people [at the time] believed in ridiculous
things. I think Freeman’s book shows
us the lived experience of people on
the ground, who have no idea the Civil
War is coming — they can [understandably] really interpret the events around
them, as being a true conspiracy to
override the freedoms of their section.
So that was something that was very
helpful, as a reminder to me, about
the power of conspiracy as a political
tradition in the United States. I think
it’s also really helpful for getting us to,
if not understand the power that conspiracies hold in our politics right now,
at least understand that we shouldn’t
dismiss them, because regardless of
whether they’re true or not, if people believe in them, they have really
important political consequences.1

JEFFERY OSTLER: There were a
couple of things that really stood out
to me, particularly [during] Professor
Freeman’s presentation two nights ago.
One was her emphasis on emotion as
a major factor. She asked us to think
about why it was that people came
to hate each other so much, and she
talked about the emotional logic of disunion. I think emotions really do matter
in history. It’s not the kind of thing that

I do in my own work so much. I’m very
oriented to structures and processes
in sometimes abstract ways, but I very
much appreciate that a historian like
Professor Freeman really emphasizes
emotion.
Another thing that stood out to me
was: she said, at the very first, there
were seventy incidences of violence
that she uncovered. She now has told
us way more than we knew about the
amount of violence in Washington,
D.C.; it’s a major contribution. She also
pointed out that this was hidden. It was
consciously concealed by people, and
that made me think about how many
times in American history violence is
covered up. As Eliza mentioned in introducing me, I work on the history of Indigenous people a lot, and I certainly am
aware that violence against Indigenous
people has often been covered up and
erased. That’s certainly true of what’s
happening in Oregon in the 1840s and,
especially, in the 1850s.

WILLIAM L. LANG: I agree with what

Stacey and Jeff are saying about the
revelations in her talk and the book
itself, and I encourage everybody to
read the book if you can get a chance.
It’s a terrific kudo, I think, for OHS to
bring her virtually into our discussion
a couple of nights ago. The thing that
struck me about it was back to the
locale. To have all of this violence and
this building animosity, as she explained
in her talk, in Congress — especially
considering January sixth of this year
— we realize that, when you concentrate the political decision-making in a
singular body (or at least to the extent

that her focus was on the House), and
these individuals are carrying with them
responsibility and opportunity, sometimes these get short-circuited, mixed
up. And, as she pointed out, violence
was something that was always lurking in the background, because of the
culture of dueling.
One of the things that struck me
was the relative absence of that kind
of violence in Oregon and Washington.
California, I’m not as familiar with to
know whether it wasn’t just a bit more
in evidence down there because of
Southerners drawn to the gold rush.
The thing that really struck me was the
impending doom that was on the horizon, and you could chart that fear with
the accretion of violence that she talked
about. It was out of their control. This to
me was maybe the most revelatory discussion, in her book and in her talk. It’s
not so much the “broken window syndrome,” [that if small problems are not
remedied, they become much worse].
It’s that they couldn’t really control it
themselves. And in a democracy, conspiracies, conflicts, personal ambition,
opportunity, and then rigid ideological
positions — which were pretty evident
in the 1850s and are evident today, of
course — can have the ability of starting
an engine, and once the train starts
moving down the track, it is exceedingly
difficult to brake.
That’s one of the things, at least
in the 1850s, that we see in textbook
descriptions of [political animosities]
getting out of control, but here was a
focused, almost laser-like recounting,
of the steps toward violence. We’re
pretty much aware of [such dangers]
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in our own life. We’ve seen it, many of
us right before us, in families, in towns,
in mob action, that sort of thing, but
to think that it’s going to infect what,
supposedly, is going to be the place
where the most important policy
decisions are made for the country,
is unsettling. [It is] not a warning to us
necessarily, but it tells us something
about fragility of the American experiment writ large.

COLEMAN: When I read the book, I

was struck by the contemporary echo
of using rules, and how the rules of the
House, the rules of the Senate were
being used just to obstruct any kind of
movement, any kind of debate, which
really resonated with me, looking at
the current political situation. I don’t
even know if that was mentioned in
the lecture, but in the book, there was
much about how these politicians, particularly Southern politicians, became
experts at using these rules just to
be able to control the agenda of the
political body. Certainly right now,
we’re seeing a debate over the future
of the filibuster, so it was hard not to
think about that.
I agree; if you enjoyed the lecture,
by all means, read the book. Dr. Freeman has this sense of fun, talking about
these horrible incidents, but that sense
of fun comes off the page, and this
book is a really enjoyable, dare I say
entertaining, book to read. I know I’ll
never look at the Congressional Globe
again, which I’ve used as a source
many times, as some sort of impartial
source of what was actually going on
in Congress at the time.
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My first question, when I was reading the book, was if Oregon saw anything like this violence that Dr. Freeman
describes in Washington. I took a look
around at this, and there were a few
scattered incidents, some heated feuds,
a lot of heavy drinking, even amongst
people who were preaching temperance. So, I saw some echoes, but I didn’t
see anything like the fighting within the
legislature that Freeman describes.
What made Oregon different? Bill, you
already alluded to this somewhat in
terms of the makeup of the settlers who
came out here to be begin with, but I’d
like to know more about what made
Oregon different.

LANG: [As whites in Oregon imposed]

a society on Indigenous land through
treaties in the early 1850s, [part of
their purpose in coming to the] West
— they argued more about religion
and sectarianism [than they did about
how they treated Native people]. They
[focused on their moral sanctity] to a
much greater extent than in most places
in the country. Part of that, of course,
was because of their ambition to be in
a new place, to be able to create their
own world, to a degree. And the other
thing that dominated it was the fact
that the first non-Native [permanent]
settlers were sectarian Methodists, but
also then joined by others, including
Catholics. So, the Catholic-Protestant
animosity that quickly developed was
analogous in some ways to the ideological [political and cultural] animosities
that Freeman talked about in Congress.
They weren’t the same thing, of course
— they weren’t trying to kill each other,

and they certainly weren’t working
off of a code of dueling — but they
were working off of another kind
of a code. They wanted to create
a society for themselves, and they
wanted to make sure that others
who came either lived by their
rules or didn’t come at all.

OSTLER: Bill is really the expert
here on political culture within
Oregon in the 1840s and 1850s. I
came across a wonderful little story
in David Johnson’s book, Founding
the Far West, where he relates that
there was a newspaper article that
was published by Horace Greeley
in the New York Tribune that talked
about a situation in Oregon in the
1857 Constitutional Convention,
where men were armed, they were
ON MARCH 16, 2021, Joanne Freeman
pulling guns, they were pulling
gave a lecture to Oregon Historical Society
knives. It was a fight between the
attendees of the Mark O. Hatfield Lecture
Series. Her book, Field of Blood: Violence
anti-slavery and the pro-slavery
in Congress and the Road to Civil War, was
forces, as though something in
published in 2018.
Oregon was happening that was
equivalent to what was happening
in bleeding Kansas at the same
time. And, according to this account Oregon papers pointed out that it was
that Horace Greeley published in the false.2 But I thought that was kind of
Tribune, weapons were fired. There revealing, both because it shows that
were only a couple of minor injuries, but there really wasn’t that kind of violence,
it would have been something like what but it also does show that, at least to
Professor Freeman was talking about. some readers and I guess to Horace
The interesting thing is that it was fake Greeley himself, it seemed possible
news; it actually had not happened. that something like that could happen
There was an unnamed individual who anywhere. If it was happening in Kansas,
had written up the fake story that sent maybe it could’ve happened in Oregon,
it off to Horace Greeley, and he fell for and one of the interesting things there
it and published it. We don’t know if he would be to wonder about why it didn’t
[Greeley] retracted it or not, when he happen in Oregon but was happening
found out it was false, [and] of course, in Kansas.
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Certainly, as Bill points out, the
political culture is different, the arguments are different, but on the other
hand, Oregon was isolated. I think
that may have been a factor, and it
was a territory, which I think also may
have been a factor in determining the
kinds of political issues that were on
the table. In Kansas, they had so much
violence because, although there were
a lot of Indigenous people in Kansas
in 1854 when it was created as a territory, there weren’t very many white
settlers. They all flooded in because
Kansas was very close to Missouri,
[and] all Missourians, pro-slavery people, flooded in. And, then, a bunch of
anti-slavery people flooded in to settle
Kansas from New England [and] the
Ohio Valley. So, the proximity of Kansas to the centers of conflict, I think,
mattered. Oregon was a long, long
ways away.

COLEMAN: It’s hard to imagine any

border ruffians making the 2,000-mile
trek to Oregon to stir up a lot of trouble,
and we can talk about how Oregon
managed to just sort of kick the can on
the slavery question, all together. Kansas had rival constitutions, [and] Oregon was going to make sure that that
didn’t happen. I would like to talk just
a little bit, if you could, Jeffrey, about
a territorial arrangement that Oregon
was under and how that affected politics within Oregon, being a territory
rather than a state, [including] what
sort of relationship that meant they
would have, not only with Washington,
D.C., but [also] in terms of how parties
operated within the territories.
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OSTLER: Oregon had been a ter-

ritory for a relatively long period of
time, and Oregonians had some real
reservations about becoming a state.
It was only really the late 1850s that
they wanted to move that way. Part of
it was because of the Dred Scott decision, which made it seem as though
slave owners would have rights to
bring slaves into territories, and that
propelled, at least some Oregonians,
to want statehood.3 I think, because
it was a fairly long territorial period,
it meant that the kinds of issues that
might have led to conflict over slavery
were able to be adjudicated without a
great deal of controversy. Bill might
be able to say more to us about that.
There was a general kind of consensus to try to keep it out of politics as
much as possible. There was a sort
of sense of a commitment to popular
sovereignty. Democrats were largely
in charge. Whigs were fairly weak all
along. And though there were factions
within the Democratic Party, they had
kind of worked out arrangements, and
under the territorial government, they
didn’t have to decide as quickly as
some other places.

COLEMAN: Stacey, I want you to
talk about Oregon and your thoughts
on this, but I also know that you’re a
historian of California, and particularly
of this period, so maybe you could talk
about Oregon and then transition into
talking about California, which was a
remarkably different situation. [California] didn’t have a territorial period like
Oregon did. The whole thing moved
very, very quickly.

SMITH: One of the key things that

actually was similar between Oregon
and California, in this period, is that
isolation that Jeff was talking about.
It’s really important to understand
that the distance between the Pacific
states and the rest of the United States
was huge, and that actually meant that
national political parties didn’t adhere
the same way in the Pacific coast states
and territories as they did elsewhere.
For instance, a really interesting thing
that comes out of Oregon is that when
Oregon finally organizes its own branch
of the Republican Party, Oregon Republicans pass a resolution in favor of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act. Going against the
Kansas-Nebraska Act was the foundation of the Republican Party nationwide,
and here you have Oregon Republicans
saying, “popular sovereignty; that’s the
key thing that we care about.” It’s incredible. I had a lot of colleagues who said,
“whoa. Oregon Republicans are voting
for Kansas-Nebraska?”4
So that’s a really interesting change
and difference that we see in Oregon,
and actually, in California, too. The Whig
party was, if not nonexistent, extremely
absent in California. Politics in California
kind of work themselves out in really
different ways, in the absence of those
national parties. People don’t go to the
[national party] conventions, because
they’re thousands of miles away, [and]
party news [from the East Coast] doesn’t
make it out to the Pacific coast for
months. So the isolation of Oregon Territory and California, I think, are pretty
important in terms of understanding
how party politics work differently on
the West Coast.

Actually, California is a lot different
than Oregon in terms of the amount of
violence [in state politics]. Whereas we
see a somewhat more homogeneous
white American population moving to
Oregon, just the flood of people that
come into California for the gold rush
[brought] a very diverse — ethnically,
racially, nationally, regionally — group
of people, [which] creates a situation
where you actually have a large number of Southerners from slave states,
including some from the deep South
who are themselves slaveholders. They
get involved in California politics, [and]
while they only make up a third of California’s U.S.-born population, they control a lot of politics in California. They
control the governorship. They control
the state supreme court. They are prominent in the legislature and the judiciary.
Two of California’s early senators are
pro-slavery Southerners.5 So, violence
is actually fairly common in California
politics. There were four major political
duels in California between 1851 and
1861; three of those ended in death. And
a man was stabbed to death on the floor
of the California Assembly in 1861. [This
stabbing] wasn’t over sectional issues,
but it was [committed by] a Southerner
who basically had the honor code, the
dueling code, in mind and essentially
stabbed his enemy to death on the floor
of the assembly.6
[Finally,] because there are a large
number of Southerners in California,
and because California actually does
have an enslaved African American
population of about 500 to 1,500 people, these issues were not absent from
California politics. It was hard to avoid
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them. Slaveholders and pro-slavery
people managed to push through a
fugitive slave act for California and then
renew it twice more so that, between
1852 and 1855, any enslaved people
who were brought into the state of California could be captured and essentially
deported back to the Southern states
and back to slavery.7 This is how powerful the slave power was in California.
So, there’s a very different scene in
California, as compared to Oregon.

COLEMAN: I just got a question from
someone who’s watching. Were Oregon Democrats different, in the 1850s,
from Southern Democrats? Obviously
the Democratic Party dominated Oregon much like it does today, but it was
a very different Democratic Party with
a very different set of constituencies.
What made Oregon Democrats different from the Southern Democrats and
even Southern Whigs, I suppose, that
Freeman talks about in her lecture and
also wrote about in her book?
LANG: Democrats in Oregon, in com-

parison with Democrats elsewhere in
the country, didn’t have some of the
really steady and reliable foes to rail
against. So, for example, there isn’t
a national bank. There isn’t a bank,
actually, in Portland until the 1860s.
So, in the 1850s, the Jacksonian strain
of the Democratic Party — which was
very much alive, and there were quite
a few Jacksonian Democrats in Oregon
— didn’t really have any windmills to
tilt against. They didn’t have anybody
especially that they were worried about.
Their major problem was whether or
not anybody was going to mess around
300
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with them, if anybody outside of Oregon
was going to try and set the agenda
to control them. They fought against
the Hudson’s Bay Company, a foreign
company, and if they looked at danger,
they looked at peril from political forces
outside of Oregon.
And we have to remind, as a point
of clarity, that there were eight federal officers in Oregon appointed [by
the President who] had considerable
power. The legislature and the local
politicians were all subservient to them
in that the money, the ultimate control,
the policy, etc., that made so much difference came from outside the territory.
The fact that they did not have
a very significant opposition party is
not unimportant, because what they
did then was, of course, to eat themselves. They went after each other; they
split apart. Those that weren’t ardent
enough were considered to be soft,
and it invited splintering and bickering.
Most of it was focused on whether or
not — back to what I said earlier — they
could control their socioeconomic
environment.

OSTLER: On the issue of slavery,
it’s clear that the pro-slavery wing
of the Democratic Party was not as
strong in Oregon as it was, as Stacey’s
talking about, in California. The center
of gravity of the Oregon Democratic
Party, I think, really was more toward a
Stephen Douglas popular sovereignty.
It’s nonetheless the case that Joe
Lane, who was then a territorial delegate and a major figure, was the vicepresidential candidate on the Breckinridge pro-slavery, deep South ticket in
the election of 1860. And although Abra-

Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-DIG-pga-04974

THIS POLITICAL CARTOON, published by Currier & Ives, ridicules the 1860
presidential and vice-presidential candidates’ positions on extending slavery to the
territories. From left to right, Abraham Lincoln, Stephen Douglas, James Buchanan, and
Samuel Breckenridge (on Buchanan’s shoulders) balance over the “Salt River” between
the North and South. John Bell and Edward Everett stand on the “Constitutional Bridge,”
and Horace Greeley sits precariously on a rail balancing on “Abolition Rock.”

ham Lincoln carried Oregon in 1860, the
Breckinridge ticket did very well.8 I don’t
think it’s necessarily a reflection of an
extremely strong pro-slavery sentiment,
as more of a reflection of Lane’s ties, but
also [of] the fact that many Oregonians
did think that the South, at least, ought
to have the right to keep slavery there,
where they had it. Oregon Democrats
— very few really did want slavery, and
the Constitution had been a free-state
constitution.

phen Douglas, the champion of popular
sovereignty, which so many Oregonians
seem to identify with and kind of based
their entire political program on. I think
we can chalk that up, perhaps, to the
popularity of Joseph Lane. If there
was a fighter for Oregon in Washington, D.C., they would’ve conceived of
Joseph Lane in that position. Stacey,
do you have anything to say about the
Southern Democrats versus Oregon
Democrats?

COLEMAN: Yes, it is fascinating that

SMITH: Again, I’m going to do the

Breckinridge got more votes than Ste-

California thing and say it’s very simi-
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lar. In California, as I mentioned, there
isn’t much of a Whig opposition party,
and so you have, as Bill aptly said, the
Democratic Party ruling everything and
essentially tearing itself apart, just in the
same way that the National Democratic
Party was doing at the same time. Ultimately, at least in California, those splits
of pro-slavery/anti-slavery just couldn’t
be contained in the same party anymore, and Californians were actually
late in terms of organizing a Republican
Party, [which they didn’t do] until 1856.
Even though John C. Frémont, the presidential candidate for the Republicans in
1856, had huge California connections,
the Republican Party was very unpopular in California until right about the
eve of the Civil War. So it is, again, very
much a story of the Democratic Party
and its inability to contain a diversity of
opinions and stances — especially, in
California, on slavery — that leads to
a political fracture that reflects what’s
going on nationally in politics.9

COLEMAN: Reading Dr. Freeman’s
book, I counted five references to Oregon, [and] none were of any particular
consequence. She didn’t necessarily
make this an easy conversation to
have, but as she mentioned in her
lecture, it was westward expansion that
really raised the temperature on NorthSouth sectional wisdom in Congress.
Particularly in the 1850s, you have all
these patches and compromises that
are trying to keep this thing together.
She focuses mostly on the controversy
over introducing slavery into the territories carved out of the Louisiana
Purchase and the Mexican secession.
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I don’t think she intended to do this,
but it can obscure what westward
expansion and settler colonialism
actually meant, on the ground, for the
people living in the antebellum West,
Native and non-Native people alike. It
also potentially reinforces a myth — I
don’t think Freeman is trying to do
this — that somehow the United States
expanded into this wilderness, or this
sort of blank canvas, when, in fact, the
West contained a multitude of different
cultures [and] communities that have
existed, overlapped, and sometimes
clashed for centuries.
So, settler encroachment on Native
land obviously instigated or exacerbated patterns of violence that were
an overwhelming concern to everyone
living in the West at the time. A lot of
the settlers saw Indigenous people as
an obstacle to settlement, an obstacle
to economic gain, whereas Indigenous
communities were struggling to maintain their position and their survival in
this rapidly shifting landscape. And,
then, you throw [in] mining, [and] suddenly everybody’s fanning out throughout the West looking for precious metals in the 1850s, which only adds to this
volatility. I’m curious: how did all these
tensions manifest themselves in terms
of regional politics? How did they show
up in regional politics?

LANG: It’s a huge question. I’m just

going to talk about a couple of things
that relate to the last part of what you
said, which was how did it relate to
politics. I think it’s fair to say — and Jeff
may have some more specific things
to add to this — if you’re in Oregon in

the 1850s, and you are trying to defend
Native people, and especially Native
people in their homelands, you’re in
a very, very small group. In the broadest possible sense, Oregonians were
racist. They were white supremacist,
not that they were different from people, say, in Illinois and New York, but
they had something much different in
mind at that particular moment — the
same kind of thing that had happened
earlier in places like Ohio and Illinois
and in the Southeast — they wanted
the land. They moved the Indians off
their homelands, in almost any way
they possibly could, and when that
tactic failed, they often used violence.
How did that work out with politics?
It seems to me that there are two or
three different ways.
One of them was — in the case of
someone like Lane, [and] in the case of
someone like Isaac Stevens, who was
the territorial Governor of Washington,
and a few others in Oregon of lesser
lights — the notion of being against the
Indians, fighting the Indians, solving
the “problem,” getting the land, moving
the community forward, being able to
develop a society—provided a ladder
rung up into national politics. On the
other end of the equation, anybody
in a local area — whether you’re in
southern Oregon, whether you’re in
the Willamette Valley, whether you’re
east of the Cascades— if you didn’t
“defend your local opportunities,” to
take advantage of anything that was
in the landscape, anything in the environment, and Indians were in your way,
as you pointed out, Ken, that could
precipitate violence. But, most impor-

tantly, your political fate, your future, all
would be tied directly to how successful you were in marginalizing Indians.

OSTLER: I think what Bill said is very

useful on this. My way of thinking
about these kinds of questions in
pretty much every place in the United
States, and certainly Oregon, is that
pretty much all white Americans agree
that they’re entitled to take the lands
of Native people. [They agree] that
Native people don’t use their lands,
that America is a superior civilization,
that white people are [a] superior
race, and that God has given them the
right to eventually have these lands
and make them productive as private
property. Divisions occur about how to
do that, and in Oregon, there’s roughly
two different approaches. One is particularly pursued in the southwestern
part of the state in the late 1840s and
1850s, and it’s really a policy of outright genocide.10 We know something
about the extent of that violence, but
I’m convinced that we don’t know
enough about it and [that] some of it’s
been erased.
That said, there are a number
of people like Joel Palmer who
don’t want to gain Indian lands that
way. [They] want to do it through a
treaty process and removal from the
Willamette Valley and Rogue River
Valley to the coast. At the moment,
the coastal areas aren’t particularly
lands in demand by white settlers.
So, there’s divisions of opinion about
how to do that, and political careers
are at stake, as Bill points out. But I
do think that’s the basic structure that

Lang, Ostler, Smith, and Coleman, The West and Congressional Fights before the Civil War

303

we have; everybody’s agreed on the
goal, the question about how to do
it is the question that people would
fight about.

COLEMAN: One thing you see in
Oregon, [is] Thomas Dryer, who sort of
led the Whigs from his party organ, the
Oregonian — his position on removal
was not terribly dissimilar from the
Democrats’ position on removal. So,
there wasn’t really going to be a lot of
debates, but again, it would be more
about tactics.
OSTLER: I’d just like to add that the

process of removing people to the
coastal reservations, what eventually
became Grand Ronde and Siletz mainly,
was terribly destructive. There are
many, many trails of tears in Oregon. It’s
not that people are being killed literally
at gunpoint — although sometimes
[they were], even in the removals — but
it’s people being forced into absolutely
miserable conditions. The death toll of
those removals is really appalling, and
that’s another kind of violence that I
don’t think we appreciate enough.11

COLEMAN: Thank you. Stacey, I’d

love to hear from you on this, especially having read your book on California. You can talk about Oregon as well;
there’s a lot that you can tell us about.

SMITH: One important thing that I can

say about the California case — and I
think this actually applies elsewhere as
well — is that we shouldn’t disconnect
this debate over the expansion of slavery from the question of what’s going
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to happen to Indigenous people. This
conversation has shown that. In some
cases, they’re literally intertwined with
each other, and one of the really strong
examples of that is in the history of California. Part of the reason that California
did not go through a territorial phase
is that Congress was deadlocked for
a couple of years between the end of
the war with Mexico and 1850, about
granting territorial status and organizing California, Utah, and New Mexico
as territories. So California was kind of
left in this limbo, where it wasn’t a territory, it was a seized colony, or state, of
Mexico, and then, it suddenly went into
statehood [when Californians decided
that they were just going to hold their
own state constitutional convention
without Congressional approval]. That
created a lot of dislocations, confusion,
and violence, especially as it regarded
Native people. There wasn’t a strong
federal presence in early U.S. California.
Some of the genocidal activity that
we see in California can be attributed
to [the fact] that the state of California
made its own Indian policy, which is not
how things are supposed to go in the
federal system; that’s a U.S. federal government prerogative. That’s not to say
that the federal government is going
to necessarily do any better for Native
people, but the chaos of the situation
— because Congress has deadlocked
over slavery in the territories and will
not act to organize these territories —
creates political conditions that allow
California to make its own decisions,
and those decisions have terrible
consequences for Native people. [The
federal government] just sort of leave[s]

OHS Research LIbrary, OHS Research Library, Mss 1277, Article XVIII, box 1, folder 15b

THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT of the Oregon Constitution includes a provision for
handling the outcome of a vote against permitting free Blacks in the state: “No free negro
or mulatto, not residing in this state at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall
ever come reside or be within this state, or hold any real estate or make any contract or
maintain any suit therein.”

it up to the California legislature, which
passes a law allowing the enslavement
and indenture of Native children, which
basically rewards — and I’m sure there
[are] cases in Oregon, too — genocidal
warfare by giving bounties to militias
that go into the inland areas and kill
Native Americans. So, the chaos generated by the inability to break that
gridlock over the question of slavery in
the territories, is [in] a lot of ways directly
related to the utter chaos in policy
toward Native Americans in California.12

COLEMAN: There’s something so

ironic about this conversation, because
as Dr. Freeman said in her lecture, it

wasn’t just Congress that was violent;
there was a lot of violence in society.
A lot of the places where the Oregon
Trail migrants originated were fraught
with mob violence. It was endemic to
life in this period. So, in many ways, they
were trying to get away from that and
start anew in a place where they can
avoid all the violence that they had left.
But, by doing so, there’s suddenly this
immediate anxiety that, at any moment,
there could be some sort of violence.
You see that very early on; there’s a lot
of fear and antipathy, particularly in the
Willamette Valley.
We don’t have much time left. I do
want to touch a little bit on anti-slavery
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politics in Oregon. Somebody asked a
question about Black exclusion, and
certainly, Black exclusion was part of
anti-slavery politics in Oregon. Oregon
has a reputation for being anti-slavery,
but it’s certainly not William Lloyd Garrison’s abolitionism that we’re talking
about. [Please talk] a little bit about what
an anti-slavery politics mean in Oregon
at this time.

them to Oregon and then establish, kind
of, de facto slavery there. So, this idea of
Black exclusion is very much linked, in
some ways, to this anti-slavery, free-soil
view that only by keeping the territories
white is it possible to keep slavery out
of the West. This is not a humanitarian
view of what it means to be against
slavery. Instead, it’s much more rooted
in economics and social concerns.13

SMITH: I think it’s really important to
make the distinction between being
someone who is anti-slavery and being
an abolitionist. We tend to combine
those two terms in a way that people
in the nineteenth century wouldn’t
have understood or necessarily done
themselves, [when] it [was] possible
to be anti-slavery, but to not be an
abolitionist. There were full-fledged
abolitionists in Oregon; they’re [a] much
smaller number. [But] the mainstream
anti-slavery view was the view of free
soil, that the West needed to be free,
that slavery needed to be excluded
from any new western territories, so that
free white workers, especially those
from the North — the region that holds
this belief — would be able to thrive and
prosper and not have to compete with
slaveholders. A big part of that is the
question of: well, if African Americans
are allowed to come into Oregon, free
or enslaved, are slaveholders going to
find a way to bring them in very large
numbers, [and] perhaps free them? This
was a worry in California, and sometimes did happen, [so there was the
perceived possibility that slaveholders
would] free the people before bringing

COLEMAN: Aside from the handful of
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abolitionists, there’s not a moral objection to slavery. It’s not even an objection
to slavery as it exists anywhere else. I
see it as a NIMBY [not in my back yard]
approach, like: we don’t want it here,
but it’s fine if you’ll do it where you are;
just don’t bring it into our community.

LANG: The only thing I would add

is that anti-slavery, whether it verged
into abolition in individual discussions,
really had an awful lot more to do with
the perception of Oregon in some ways
as being moral, that is, being on moral
grounds. Many individuals who made
any kind of a comment about it were
getting on a high horse by comparison
with their compatriots. It didn’t have any
real effect, any power, as a moral issue
in Oregon politics. The major problem,
or major thing that they were trying to
do, was to create a socioeconomic new
world [in Oregon]. So, I think that Stacey’s right about the economic aspects
of it, the free-soil vision, and that sort of
thing. I really think it’s an awfully insular
issue for Oregonians, essentially moral
questions that don’t have any political
bite or traction.

COLEMAN: The only thing I wanted

to add to that [is], in terms of Oregon,
when they were coming up with the
state constitution, they went very
quickly. They drafted up this constitution in a couple months. One of the
reasons it went so quickly, is they just
decided to have, basically, a gag rule
on slavery and, really, a gag rule on
Black exclusion. They saw these as
probably the two most controversial
topics. They just kicked the can to
popular sovereignty and said, “we’ll
just let the voters decide.” So, I think
there is some resonance there with
kind of the gag rule that dominates
a section of Freeman’s book. I did

see an echo in Oregon, where they
could just avoid the sort of melee
that Horace Greeley described in that
newspaper article. They were able to
avoid it because they just didn’t even
talk about it.

CANTY-JONES: Thank you all so

much. The hour has just flown by. I
want to say thank you, again, to all
of our Hatfield Lecture Series sponsors and, especially, thank you to all
of you for taking the time to share
your knowledge with us tonight and
putting in the extra work to look up
different things in books today. Take
care everybody.
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